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Benign Restraint: The SEC's Regulation
of Execution Systems
David M. Schizer

To the handful of traders who founded the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) in 1792-and perhaps even to the securities traders of the
1960's-today's securities markets would be virtually unrecognizable. New
communications and data processing technologies, the globalization of
investment portfolios, and a surge in trading volume have created new needs
and possibilities. As a result, revolutionary advances have occurred in the
design and performance of execution systems: the technologies (computers,
telephones, modems) and formats (auction-based stock exchanges, dealer-based
"over-the-counter" markets, computerized single price auctions) that traders use
to conduct trades. These advances enable trades on the NYSE, the regional
exchanges, the over-the-counter markets, and emerging computerized execution
systems to be conducted more rapidly, more accurately, and more inexpensively
than ever before.
Amid this era of transformation, most critics have called upon the Securities1
Exchange Commission (SEC) to mandate a single type of execution system,
something the SEC has refused to do. Some critics diagnose this reluctance as
a symptom of regulatory "capture." For example, Jonathan Macey and David
1. See, e.g., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ELECTRONIC BULLS AND BEARS: U.S. SECURITIES
MARKETS AND INFORmATION TECHNOLOGY 7-13, 49-51, 59-60 (1990) [hereinafter ELECTRONIC BULLS &
BEARS] (questioning viability of specialist system); Milton H. Cohen, The National Market System-A
Modest Proposal,46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 743, 754-89 (1978) (calling on SEC to develop various market
links such as a composite quotations system, to promulgate new execution and market-maker rules, and to
study issues relating to development of "national market system of the future"); David A. Lipton, Best
Execution: The NationalMarket System's MissingIngredient,57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 449, 462-63, 499-505
(1982) (faulting SEC for failing to propose a best execution rule, which would require traders to search
various markets for the best price); Jonathan R. Macey & David D. Haddock, Shirking at the SEC: The
Failureof the NationalMarket System, 1985 U. ILL L. REV. 315, 332-37, 361 (criticizing SEC for failing
to promote competition among dealers by lifting off-board trading restrictions--rules that require exchange
members to trade only on exchange floor); Norman S. Poser, Restructuring the Stock Markets: A Critical
Look at the SEC's National Market System, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 883, 946 (1981) (criticizing SEC for
vacillation and procrastination in developing National Market System and thus advising SEC to reconsider
development of system); Joel Seligman, The Futureof the NationalMarket System, 10 J. CORP. L. 79, 13739 (1984) (criticizing SEC for failing to promote a universal message switch-a market link that would
relay orders to the market displaying the best quote-and competition among dealers markets); Walter
Werner, The SEC as a Market Regulator,70 VA. L. REv. 755, 770-84 (1984) (criticizing SEC for failing
to take more activist stance in developing National Market system and urging "government [to] acquire...
[the] capability" to develop such a system).
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Haddock suggest that the SEC does not regulate more intrusively because it
2
is unwilling to offend various special interests.
This Note argues that the SEC acted wisely in choosing a strategy of
"benign restraint," rather than designating a single, preferred execution system.
Although the motives of the SEC are difficult to discern, it is unlikely that the
agency has been "captured" by special interests.3 Regardless of the SEC's
reasons, however, this Note claims that the SEC's restrained regulatory strategy
is the best one. To develop this argument, Part I describes the goal pursued by
the SEC-insuring that the securities markets will maximize societal
wealth-and the problems associated with nurturing such a market. Part II
describes recent manifestations of the SEC's restrained regulatory strategy. Part
III then considers criticisms of the SEC's approach. Finally, Part IV discusses
the advantages of benign restraint
I. THE REGULATORY PROBLEM

A. The Public Interest at Stake
Securities markets promote a vital public interest-the maximization of
society's wealth 4 -by performing five functions. First, they help corporations
and governmental bodies raise capital and thus create wealth and jobs.5 Second,
through "price discovery," capital markets assign a value to the building blocks
of the world's economy. Third, these prices influence investment calculations,
employment decisions, and the allocation of resources.6 Fourth, the markets
allow individuals to invest their savings7 and to guide management by

2. Macey & Haddock, supranote 1, at 315-16.
3. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 24 (1991); HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 8 (1979); SUSAN M. PHILLIPS & J.
RICHARD ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 5 (1981); Poser, supra note 1, at 946.
4. The argument of this Note should be persuasive to those who believe that wealth maximization is
the sole public interest implicated in the regulation of execution systems. This is not an unreasonable belief,
in that securities market's raison d'etre is to create wealth, not to serve as the ultimate level playing field
or the fairest of casinos. Redistributive or fairness goals are better pursued by other means.
Yet this Note's thesis should also be persuasive to those who believe that regulators of execution
systems should be concerned with fairness as well as wealth maximization. Indeed, achieving fairness may
be an essential prerequisite to achieving wealth maximization. In order to maximize wealth, a market must
be perceived as fair. Otherwise, investors will be wary of bringing their capital to the market-a situation
not calculated to promote capital formation, price discovery, or the other functions of an effective capital
market. See ROBERT A. SCHWARTZ, RESHAPING THE EQUITY MARKETS 174 (1991). For clarity, this Note
speaks of wealth maximization as the public interest involved in the regulation of execution systems. The
goal of wealth maximization, however, substantially encompasses the fairness objective.
5. ELECTRONIC BULLS & BEARS, supra note 1, at 25.
6. See SANFORD I. GROSSMAN, THE INFORMATIONAL ROLE OF PRICES (1989). But see Lynn A. Stout,

The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities
Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 613, 696-706 (1988) (challenging allocative efficiency justification for
promoting accuracy in pricing).
7. ELECTRONIC BULLS & BEARS, supra note 1, at 25, 30-31.
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expressing collective judgments about publicly traded companies.8 Finally,
capital markets provide jobs to Americans in an era when some other industries
are faltering.9
B. The Policy Dilemma
Deciding which execution system promotes wealth maximization most
effectively is enormously difficult. Theoreticians, traders, and investors disagree,
often heatedly, about which characteristics of an execution system-such as
speed, cost, and accuracy-are most important, which mix of attributes would
be optimal, and which technologies and structures are most likely to implement
this mix.
1. The Problem of Priorities
No system is perfect, and attempts to improve a system's performance in
one area tend to undermine its performance in others. For example, there is a
tradeoff between reliability and cost. To ensure that a system can accommodate
uncharacteristically large trading volumes, designers must include considerable
excess capacity, an expensive endeavor. 10 Not surprisingly, players assign
different values to an execution system's various features. For instance, because
program traders earn their living by executing large, precisely timed trades, they
emphasize speed more than the average investor does."
When faced with conflicting preferences, regulators must decide whether
to prescribe a single mix of characteristics for all trading systems; to require
different mixes for different situations; or to elect not to prescribe any mix,
thereby allowing private actors to guess investors' preferences and to compete
for their patronage.
2. The UncertainPath of Technology
Even if investors valued exactly the same combination of
characteristics-and surely they do not-regulators would still have to
determine which market structures and technologies would provide that mix
most effectively. Choosing the proper technology can be difficult because the
capabilities of a technology are typically unknown and unpredictable; before
a system is activated, experts often do not agree on how it will perform relative
8. Id. at 25, 29-30.
9. Id. at 25, 31-32.
10. See generally GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, STOCK MARKET AUTOMATION: EXCHANGES HAVE
INCREASED SYSTMS' CAPACITIES SINCE THE 1987 MARKET CRASH (1991) [hereinafter STOCK MARKET
AUTOMATION].
11. See SCHWARrZ, supranote 4, at 107-10 (describing activities of program traders, including basket
trading, portfolio insurance, and index arbitrage).
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to other systems. Moreover, because recent technological growth in the
securities industry has been so explosive, any technology chosen is likely to
become outmoded rapidly."
3. The Debate Over Market Structure: Auction vs. DealerMarkets
In selecting an execution system, regulators would have to choose either
the "dealer" or "auction" format. On a dealer market, such as the National
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ) or
the London Stock Exchange, professional traders known as "dealers" or
"market-makers" trade with the public. If customers wish to buy, the dealer
sells them the security from his own portfolio, and if customers wish to sell,
the dealer purchases their securities for himself. The dealer publishes a
schedule, the "bid-ask spread," which states the prices at which he will trade.
To make a profit, the dealer buys the security at a lower price than he will
charge when selling it.
In contrast, on auction markets such as the Tokyo and New York Stock
Exchanges, brokers trade as agents rather than as principals. 13 When a
customer wishes to sell, a commission broker on the NYSE does not buy the
stock from him, as would a NASDAQ dealer. Rather, the commission broker
represents the customer in a search for a broker whose client wishes to buy at
the same price. By finding a buyer for his seller, the broker earns a
commission. Ultimately, rather than trading with a dealer, the customers on an
auction market trade with each other, albeit via agents. 4
Theoreticians and practitioners clash over the comparative liquidity,
accuracy, fairness, and reliability of dealer and auction markets.15 In order to
designate a particular system, regulators would have to choose a side in this
longstanding rivalry.
II. AN

ERA OF

BENIGN RESTRAINT

Faced with a technological revolution, a heated debate over market
structure, and a marketplace of investors with diverse preferences, the SEC has
so far decided not to decide. It has not designated a preferred execution system
and instead has relied on competition within the private sector.

12. See Richard 0. Scribner, The TechnologicalRevolutionin SecuritiesTrading: CanRegulationKeep
Up?, in TECmNOLOGy AND THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 19, 19-21 (Anthony Saunders &
Lawrence J. White eds., 1986) (surveying changes that technology has effected in marketplace).
13. The NYSE also has elements of a dealer market. Every stock on the NYSE is assigned to a dealer,

known as a "specialist," who is responsible for making a market in the stock. As the trader of last resort,
he provides the market with liquidity. See Poser, supra note 1, at 890.
14. Id. at 888-93.
15. For further discussion of the relative merits of auction and dealer market structures, see infra notes
79-90 and accompanying text.
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A. A Host of New Trading Systems
By standing aside, the SEC has allowed private firms to generate a cascade
of new trading systems: automated systems that publish dealers' spreads, 6
networks that channel an order from the customer's keyboard to a trading
18
floor, 7 and even systems that execute orders automatically.
B. The Survival of the NYSE Trading Floor
Even before the London Stock Exchange closed its trading floor in 1986,
the New York Stock Exchange was under pressure to "automate" its trading.'
After 1986, criticism of the NYSE intensified, 20 and the SEC drew fire for
refusing to force the NYSE down London's path."
The SEC properly withstood this pressure. The NYSE has not refused to
close the trading floor solely to protect its members, though powerful groups
on the floor would, of course, resist being replaced by computers. Sound policy
reasons militate against imitating London. By automating its trading floor, the
London Exchange encountered a host of difficulties, particularly in the
clearance and settlement of trades.22 Furthermore, even if London's experience
had been a success, it would have questionable relevance for the NYSE because
while London was a dealer market before closing its floor, the NYSE is
essentially an auction market. Dealer markets are easier to automate because
they simply depend on the dealer to name her price, which customers may
accept or reject. A dealer can just as easily display her quotes on a computer
screen as at a trading booth. An auction market, in contrast, requires competitive bidding and negotiation and thus cannot be computerized as readily;
16. NASDAQ is the most widely used of these systems. See Michael J. Simon & Robert L.D. Colby,
The National Market System for Over-the-Counter Stocks, 55 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 17, 34-44 (1986)
(recounting history of NASDAQ).
17. After the NYSEintroduced the Designated Order Tumaround System (DOT), the first such network,
and then the Super-DOT system, an upgraded version, the nation's other exchanges introduced similar
systems: Max on the Midwest Stock Exchange, Scorex on the Pacific Exchange, Pace in Philadelphia, and
Beacon in Boston. See Saul Hanseil, The Wild, Wired World of Electronic Exchanges, INSTtrnONAL
INVESTOR, Sept. 1989, at 91-92.
18. Equity traders can use the Cincinnati Stock Exchange's National Securities Trading System (NSTS),
Instinet's Crossing Network, and leffries Company's Posit. The Chicago Mercantile Exchange and the
Chicago Board of Trade are developing such systems for trading options, and a system called Portal is
available for trades in private placements. See id. at 92-93.
19. See The Balancing Act at the New York Stock Exchange, INsTrrtrioNAL INVESTOR, Sept. 1989,
at 94 [hereinafter Balancing Act].
20. E.g., Jason Forsythe, The Big Board:Boxed in by Automation, INFO. WK., May 20, 1991, at 46;
David Kull & Lee Keough, The House of Games, COWMUTER & COMM. DEcisIoNs, Aug. 1988, at 43;
Richard L. Stem, A Dwindling Monopoly, FORBES, May 13, 1991, at 64; Richard L. Stem, "The Market
Is a Price,Not a Place," FORBES, Feb. 5, 1990, at 41 [hereinafter Stem, "The Market Is a Price,Not a
Place"]; Chris Welles, Is It ime to Make the Big Board a Black Box?, Bus. WK., Feb. 5, 1990, at 74.
21. See, e.g., Pavan Sahgal, Integration Dream Eludes the National Marketplace, WALL STREEr
COMPuTER REV., Sept. 1990, at 4.
22. See, e.g., Monica Roman, High Tech Clogs ClearingSystems, AM. BANKER, Dec. 18, 1987, at 16.
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this sort of interaction is not easily duplicated on a screen.23 Additionally, if
the NYSE had followed London by replacing its auction with an automated
dealer format, it would have lost certain advantages available only in auction
4
markets.
Without abandoning the auction format, the NYSE nevertheless used
automation to enhance the speed and efficiency of its trading. For example, the
"Super-DOT" system, which handles approximately eighty percent of the
NYSE's transactional volume, can relay 210 orders to the floor each second
and then display them on electronic screens that print prices hundreds of times
faster than mechanical printers?5
C. A RestrainedResponse to the Crash
The stock market crash of October 19, 1987 created a swirl of pressures
on the SEC to take some action, even ill-considered action, as a way of
reassuring the public. Government officials generated a frenzy of accusations,
studies, and recommendations.2 Yet the SEC withstood the temptation, so
strong amidst the wreckage left by the crash, to fix things that were not broken.
It is unlikely that execution systems caused the crash. After all, markets
across the globe-each with a different execution system-all experienced rapid
price declines.27 It seems more likely that the market break derived either from
a shift in economic fundamentals2 or from a sudden loss of investor
confidence. 29 In either case, the initial decline in price was probably

23. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, at 80-81 (noting that live auctions convey information-such as the
identity of customers placing large orders and the body language and tone of voice of the traders-which
is lost when auction is computerized). For further discussion of the complications involved in black box
trading, see infra text accompanying notes 91-95.
24. E.g., SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, at 60 (noting that price discovery may be less effective on dealer
markets than on auction markets). See infra text accompanying notes 79-90 for further discussion of the
relative merits of auction and dealer markets.
25. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, at 31-32 (describing Super-DOT).
26. E.g., FinancialMarket Regulatory Reform, 1988: Hearings on H.R. 4997 Before the Subcomm.
on Telecommunications andFinanceof the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d. Sess.
(1988); Oversight Hearings-MattersRelating to the October19 Market Break, 1988: HearingsBefore the
Senate Comm. on Agriculture,Nutrition, and Forestry,100th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1988) [hereinafter Oversight
Hearings]; DIVISION OF MARKET REGULATION, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, THE OCTOBER 1987
MARKET BREAK (1988) [hereinafter SEC's STUDY OF 1987 MARKET BREAK]; GENERAL ACCOUNTNG
OFFICE, FINANCIAL MARKETS: PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON THE OCTOBER 1987 CRASH (1988); REPORT
OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS (1988) [hereinafter BRADY COMI&SSION
REPORT].

27. Cf.Richard Roll, The InternationalCrashof October1987, in BLACK MONDAY AND THE FUTURE
OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 35 (Robert W. Kamphuis, Jr. et al. eds., 1989) (arguing that worldwide nature of
market break is inconsistent with various popular explanations that attribute crash to institutional
arrangements existing in only a few markets) [hereinafter BLACK MONDAY].
28. See Eugene F. Fama, Perspectives on October 1987, or, What Did We Learn From the Crash?,
in BLACK MONDAY, supra note 27, at 71 (arguing that crash is consistent with traditional understanding
of efficient capital markets even if cause of crash cannot be identified).
29. Robert Shiller, Financial Speculation: Economic Efficiency and Public Policy 7 (1991) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (market crash of 1987 was "old-fashioned speculative panic").
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exacerbated by various investment strategies such as portfolio insurance and
other types of program trading. These strategies required money managers to
sell their holdings when prices dipped below a certain level, thereby creating
a vicious cycle. As prices fell, the programs generated sell orders that caused
prices to fall further.3" Though these strategies may warrant some action in
response by the SEC, they relate to theformulation of trades rather than to their
execution. Thus, the SEC's restraint was justified because while the problems
posed by "program trading" are sometimes confused with those associated with
automated execution systems, they are analytically distinct.
While execution systems did not cause the crash, they might nevertheless
have performed better. If exchange specialists and NASDAQ market-makers
had possessed more capital, they might have slowed the decline of prices
slightly3 1-though no market-maker could have had enough capital to stabilize
prices against the onslaught of sell orders then besieging the market. "Circuit
breakers," which halt trading in a stock when its price has moved a certain
amount, might have helped to dissipate the panic.32 Furthermore, investors
might have panicked less feverishly had they been confident that the exchanges'
trading technologies could handle the heavy volume of the crash. Finally,
technological imperfections in the NYSE's execution systems may have
disadvantaged small investors. The printers relaying Super-DOT's small orders
to the specialists were too slow to accommodate heavy volume. As a result,
small orders were backlogged, sometimes for over an hour.33 In contrast, large
orders (which typically were placed with floor brokers) could be executed
without this delay. Moreover, institutional investors had better communications
links with traders than small investors.'
The private sector needed no encouragement from the SEC to address these
weaknesses. The industry was eager to avert another crash and to reassure
investors that the markets were functioning smoothly.35 As a result, the SEC
was able to assume a restrained, supervisory role that relied on the private
sector to revamp itself. For example, the NYSE implemented "circuit
' required specialists to maintain more capital; 37 spent millions
breakers;"36
to enhance the reliability of its automated systems; and enhanced the reliability
of the Super-DOT printers; increased their number; and replaced some of them
30. Lawrence Harris, TheDangersofRegulatory Overreactionto the October1987Crash,74 CORNELL
L. REV. 927 (1989).
31. See ELECrRONIC BULLS & BEARS, supra note 1, at 58-61 (describing performance of specialists
and market-makers during crash).
32. Id. at 57-58.
33. SEC's STUDY OF 1987 MARKET BREAK, supra note 26, at 7:15-16, 7:21-23.
34. Id. at 7:14.
35. Cf. Oversight Hearings,supra note 26, at 275-79 (statement of Richard Grasso, Executive Vice
President, Capital Markets, NYSE) (describing efforts undertaken voluntarily by NYSE to avert recurrence
of problems associated with crash).
36. SCHVARTZ, supra note 4, at 44-45.
37. DIVISION OF MARKET REGULATION, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, MARKET ANALYSIS OF
OCTOBER 13 AND 16, 1989, at 16 (1990) [hereinafter SEC'S 1989 MARKET ANALYSIS].
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with electronic screens38 so that small orders would not again be backlogged
39
to the detriment of small investors.
D. RestrainedRegulation of Automation Risk
The stock market crash highlighted the danger of automation risk:4 0 the
vulnerability of trading technologies to overload as a result of heavy volume,
manipulation, or computer viruses. In response, the SEC opened an Office of
International Trading and Technology4 1 and has suggested ways, in two recent
releases, to test for and minimize various automation risks.4 2 Committed to
benign restraint, the SEC has made adherence to these suggestions voluntary
and has resisted pressure, particularly from the Government Accounting Office
(GAO), to expand the size and responsibilities of the new office.43
This restrained regulatory posture is appropriate. If the SEC required specific review methods and operating standards, it might prevent the private sector
from developing better ones. In addition, private firns presumably have strong
incentives to minimize automation risk because unreliable systems are
unattractive to customers. 4 Thus, the private sector needs little encouragement
from government in this area.
Indeed, the efforts of the private sector to reduce automation risk have been
effective so far. For example, the NYSE's systems performed far better during
the market break of 1989-a 250 point plunge in the Dow Jones Industrial
Average-than during the crash of 1987. In the 1989 downturn precipitated by
the collapse of an attempted takeover of United Airlines, 45 small orders were
not backlogged, and only minor problems emerged in the NYSE's automated
46
systems.

38. Id. at 53, 61-62 (describing improvements in NYSE printers and introduction of electronic display
books).
39. Even so, the SEC may occasionally have to intervene in order to protect small investors. See infra
note 121.
40. See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL MARKETS: ACTIVE OVERSIGHT OF MARKET
AUTOMATION BY SEC AND CFFC NEEDED (1991) [hereinafter ACTIVE OVERSIGHT NEEDED] (discussing

automation risk).
41. See Mark Arend, Electronic Markets Heighten Regulatory Concerns, WALL STREET COMPUTER
REV., Jan. 1991, at 31 (discussing new SEC office).
42. Automated Systems of Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 27,445 [19891990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,505 (Nov. 16, 1989); Automated Systems of SelfRegulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 29,185 [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 84,733 (May 9, 1991).
43. E.g., ACTIVE OVERSIGHT NEEDED, supranote 40, at 6-8 (urging SEC to regulate automation more
vigorously).
44. Cf.David D. Haddock, An EconomicAnalysisof the BradyReport: PublicInterest,Special Interest,
or Rent Extraction? 74 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 851 (1989) (noting that profit motive gives exchanges
incentive to avoid repetition of information overload that plagued exchanges during 1987 crash).
45. SEC's 1989 MARKET ANALYSIS, supra note 37, at 17.
46. Id. at 37-38.
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E. The RestrainedRegulation of ProprietarySystems: Delta Optionsand SPAworky
Consistent with benign restraint, the SEC has promoted competition through
its regulation of "proprietary systems," execution systems that are distinguished
by the manner in which they are owned. Proprietary systems are the property
of the firm that built them. In contrast, most execution systems are owned by
a membership of brokers or dealers. For example, NASDAQ-which is not a
proprietary systen--is owned by the National Association of Securities Dealers,
rather than by Bunker-Ramo, the firn that built the system.4 7
In the last two years, the private sector has created two "proprietary"
systems that trade securities in a computerized auction. Three companies-the
broker RMJ Options Trading Co., the clearinghouse Delta Government Options
Co., and the bank Security Pacific National Trust Co.-created the Delta system
for trading options on government securities. The Delta system enables a
customer to input orders anonymously, prints them on a computer screen, and
invites other customers to respond anonymously via their own computer
terminals.48 "SPA-works," the creation of R. Stephen Wunsch, a former trader
at Kidder Peabody, 49 is a computer network for the trading of NYSE-listed
stocks. The system, a "single price auction," accepts a host of orders during
a designated time period and then uses sophisticated software to distill a market
clearing price from these orders.
The securities industry is divided over the virtues of proprietary systems.
Not surprisingly, the exchanges and the over-the-counter markets oppose these
potential competitors. Thus, the Chicago Board of Trade and the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange sued to block the creation of the Delta system. 0
Similarly, the NYSE; 51 AMEX;5 2 NASD; and the Pacific, 53 Boston, and
Midwestern Exchanges publicized their opposition to SPA-works. Yet
institutional traders support the proprietary model because they want to develop
their own trading systems to avoid paying commissions and spreads.54 Another
reason to support the proprietary model is that it is uniquely suited to promote
47. See Simon & Colby, supra note 16, at 36 (describing design and construction of NASDAQ).
48. Board of Trade v. SEC (Board of Trade 1), 883 F.2d. 525, 527 (7th Cir. 1989).
49. Leslie Wayne, A Rock Climber's Reachfor the Top on Wall St., N.Y. TIMs, Jan. 24, 1991, at DL.
50. See Board of Trade 1, 883 F.2d. at 525; Board of Trade v. SEC (Boardof Trade 11), 923 F.2d. 1270
(7th Cir. 1991).
51. Jayne Levin, Big Board Urges Regulators to Reject Wunsch Exemption; Fears Split Between
Institutional,Retail Trading, INVEsTmENT DEALERS' DIG., Jan. 14, 1991, at 9; NYSE DisputesSEC's Power
to Exempt Wunsch System, INsTrrIONAL INVESTOR, Jan. 14, 1991, at 7.
52. Jayne Levin, American Stock Exchange Urges SEC to Go Slow on New System; Says Wunsch
System Could Handle Huge Volume, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Dec. 24, 1990, at 6; AMEX Slams
Wunsch's Bidfor Exemption, WALL STREET Lirnr , Dec. 24, 1990, at 9.
53. Hal Lux, PacificExchange CriticizesWunsch RegistrationExemption;Cites "PracticalExtvinction"
of Rule, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Dec. 10, 1990, at 8.
54. D. Grant Vingoe, New Trading Systems Demand New Regulation; SEC's Handlingof Electronic
Trading Systems is Shortsighted,INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Apr. 15, 1991, at 26.
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investment in new trading technologies. In a proprietary system, the
entrepreneur has greater incentive than in a membership exchange to risk capital
to build a new trading system because the entrepreneur retains control over the
system and the profits it earns.
To attack the proprietary systems, the exchanges demanded that their
fledgling competitors "register" under section 6 of the Securities Exchange
Act,55 even though (indeed, precisely because) such registration was incompatible with the proprietary format. Registration entails significant
administrative costs: registered exchanges must publish and enforce trading
rules, gain SEC approval of rule changes, and conform to the other requirements of the Act. Furthermore, the requirements for registration were drafted
to apply to membership exchanges rather than to proprietary systems. The Act
refers to the exchange's "membership" and to the manner in which members
must be treated.56 Yet a proprietary system has no membership. It is owned
by a private consortium and operated by the employees of the consortium on
behalf of customers. Moreover, the rules bar a registered exchange from
permitting "unfair discrimination between ... brokers. 57 Yet a proprietary
system is inherently "discriminatory" because only its owner may use it. Thus,
RMJ Options, one of the three firms which owns Delta, is the system's only
broker. In order to fulfill the requirements for registration, a proprietary system
would have to become a membership exchange, 58 thus becoming less effective
at promoting entrepreneurial investment.
Perhaps to avoid this disincentive and to promote the birth of proprietary
competitors, the SEC defended Delta Options and SPA-works. With a narrow
reading of section 6 of the Securities Exchange Act, the SEC exempted Delta
from registration. At first, the SEC tried to avoid the section 6 issue while still
allowing Delta to operate. It treated two portions of Delta-the trading and
clearance operations-as distinct entities. The SEC authorized the trading arm
to commence operations via a no-action letter, which could not be challenged
since it was not judicially reviewableO 9 Then the SEC registered Delta's
clearinghouse, reserving judgment on whether the Delta system as a whole was
an exchange.'

55. 15 U.S.C. § 78(f) (1988).
56. Securities Exchange Act, § 6(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78(f)(b)(3) (1988), provides that the registered
exchange must "assure a fair representation of its members in the selection of its directors."
57. Securities Exchange Act, § 6(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78(f)(b)(5) (1988).
58. Board of Trade II, 923 .2d. 1270, 1272-73 (7th Cit 1991).
59. In general, inaction by an administrative agency is not reviewable. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470
U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (articulating presumption of unreviewability for agency inaction). No-action letters,
specifically, are not reviewable because they are considered tentative, not final. The SEC agrees to take no
action at the time of the letter, so long as conditions are satisfied. The SEC, however, is free to change its
position. Board of Trade 1, 883 F.2d. 525, 529-30 (7th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, no-action letters are not
reviewable because courts consider them a refusal to prosecute, which is a "classic illustration of a decision

committed to agency discretion." Id. at 530.
60. 883 F.2d at 528-29.
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Unwilling to let the SEC duck the section 6 issue, the exchanges challenged
this registration in court. They demanded that the SEC resolve whether Delta
was an exchange before registering the clearinghouse. According to the
exchanges, the clearinghouse and the trading arm were not distinct entities; in
fact, the trading arm was the clearinghouse's only customer. Thus, the
exchanges argued, the clearinghouse should not be registered if Delta was an
exchange that did not comply with section 6; if this was the case, the clearinghouse would be a part of an illegal trading system. 1 Judge Easterbrook
upheld this claim and required the SEC to resolve the predicate issue of
whether Delta was an exchange. "[A]n agency is not entitled to duck," he
scolded, "just because the question is hard."'62
In response, the SEC held that Delta was not an exchange for the purposes
of section 6 and, consequently, that the clearinghouse could register separately.
In defense of this conclusion, the SEC offered a strained, but plausible, reading
of section 6. The section defines an "exchange" as "any organization,
association, or group of persons... which constitutes, maintains, or provides
a market place or facilities for bringing together purchasers and sellers of
securities or for otherwise performing with respect to securities the functions
commonly performed by a stock exchange as that term is generally
understood."6 3 Although the futures exchanges that challenged the SEC's order
contended that Delta was clearly an organization which "provides a market
place or facilities for bringing together purchasers and sellers of securities," the
SEC responded that Delta was not "a stock exchange as the term is generally
understood," because it lacked the common features of an exchange, such as
specialists and a trading floor. 4 Judge Posner deferred to the SEC's
construction of the statute on the grounds that "[a]n administrative agency has
discretion to interpret a statute that is not crystal clear" and that "in this case
there is enough play in the statutory joints that [the SEC's] decision must be
affirmed.'6S
After its victory regarding Delta, the SEC spared SPA-works from
registration by resuscitating section 5(2),66 an exception to section 6 that had
not been used since 1939. Under that exception, the SEC may find that an
exchange's volume is too low to justify registration.67 Anticipating low volume
for SPA-works, the SEC exempted the new system from registration provided
that its volume remained lower than that of the regulated exchange with the
lowest volume, currently the Cincinnati Stock Exchange, a condition which

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 533-34.
Id. at 536.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
Board of Trade II, 923 F.2d. 1270, 1272 (7th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1273.
15 U.S.C. § 78(e) (1988).
Id.
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seems likely to continue.6 8 Free of crushing regulatory burdens, SPA-works
commenced operations on April 15, 1991.69
F. The Promotion of Off-Hours Trading
As investment portfolios become increasingly global in scope, customers
want access to markets at any hour of the day, rather than merely during traditional business hours. Measured by New York time, British investors may wish
to trade as early as 3:30 a.m., while Japanese money managers may want to
trade well into the night. Americans responding to news in foreign markets may
also wish to trade during off-hours." Since trading is becoming a twenty-four
hour affair,71 American securities markets can better serve investors by
extending their hours. In addition, by failing to lengthen their trading sessions,
American markets risk losing volume-and thus jobs-to overseas
exchanges.7 2
To extend the hours on America's securities markets, the SEC could depend
on market forces. The private sector has an incentive to lengthen its hours,
provided that doing so does not excessively increase the cost of operations.
Consequently, the NYSE has pledged to have twenty-four hour trading by the
year 2000.' 3 With the SEC's approval,74 the NYSE opened an automated
68. In 1990, the average daily volume of the Cincinnati Stock Exchange was 1,238,241 shares. Self
Regulatory Organizations; Wunsch Auction Systems, Inc.; Order Granting Limited Volume Exemption from
Registration as an Exchange under Section 5 of the Securities Exchange Act, Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 28,899, 1991 SEC LEXIS 283, at *21 n.40 (Feb. 20, 1991). In contrast, SPA-works' volume
on its first day of trading was 300 shares. After Hours Stock Exchange Trades 300 Shares in Session, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 16, 1991, at 21.
69. See Betty Wong, Wunsch Launches US. ElectronicTrading System, REUTERS FIN. REP., Apr. 24,
1991, at 2.
The saga of proprietary systems is still unfolding. The SEC is committed to its approach and has
proposed Rule 15c-10, which codifies the policy developed for Delta and SPA-works. Vingoe, supra note
54, at 26. However, Congressman John Dingell, chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee,
has questioned the SEC's handling of proprietary systems, Wunsch System May Spur Laws For New
"Exchanges," INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Dec. 10, 1990, at 12, and has said that he favors hearings on this
issue. Hal Lux & Jayne Levin, Dingell Said to Push Hearing on Electronic Trading Systems: Exchanges
Keep Blasting SEC Decision, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Mar. 25, 1991, at 8; Wunsch Auction System
to Start Up Today; Dingell Watching Closely, SECURITIES WK., Apr 8, 1991, at 8. SEC commissioner
Richard Roberts has indicated support for Dingell's position. SEC'sRoberts Joins Dingell in Proprietary
TradingSystem Controversy,SECURrrIES WK., May 13, 1991, at 1. The threat of congressional intervention
is significant because firms considering investments in proprietary systems might now hesitate.
70. See Mary Biliard, Trouble Sleeping? Call a 24-Hour Trading Desk, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1991,
at F23.
71. See generally OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESsMENT, TRADING AROUND THE CLOCK: GLOBAL
SECURITIES MARKETS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (1990).

72. For example, during the hours before the NYSE and NASDAQ open, an increasing volume of
NYSE and NASDAQ stocks are traded on the London Stock Exchange, a trend that has alarmed both the
exchanges and various government actors. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Supports Plan for Earlier
Trading of Stocks in the US., N.Y. TIMES, Oct 11, 1991, at Al, D5.
73. Stephen Labaton, Extra 7me for TradesExpected, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1991, at DI, Ds.
74. Order Granting Temporary Approval to Proposed Rule Changes Relating to the New York Stock
Exchange's Off Hours Trading Facility, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 29,237, 1991 SEC LEXIS
983 (May 24, 1991); Stephen Labaton, Late Stock Trades Approved by SEC, N.Y. TWIES, May 21, 1991,
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trading system in June 1991,' 5 which allows customers to trade stock at the
4 p.m. closing price between 4 p.m. and 5:30 p.m. 76 In response, the AMEX
began developing its own off-hours system, 77 and the over-the-counter market
also extended its hours. The NASD recently initiated an early morning trading
session, "NASDAQ International," which opens with London at 3:30 a.m.
78
Eastern Standard Time.
III. THE LIMITATIONS OF BENIGN RESTRAINT

Critics have faulted the SEC's policy of benign restraint for its refusal to
choose the "best" execution system, its alleged failure to honor the relevant
statutory provisions, its willingness to risk "fragmenting" the markets, and its
neglect of small investors. This part evaluates these criticisms.
A. Failure to Select "the Best" Execution System
A number of commentators, who claim to be able to ascertain which
execution system is most effective at maximizing wealth, have attacked the SEC
for failing to compel the industry to adopt that format or technology. These
commentators rally around three different plans: dealer markets, auction
markets, and fully automated "black box" trading.
Jonathan Macey, David Haddock, and Joel Seligman have urged the SEC
to promote trading on competitive dealer markets.79 They favor competition
at Al.
75. Kurt Eichenwald, A FirstStep in the March to a 24-HourStock Market, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1991,
§ 4, at 4.
76. The plan also reduces the disclosure obligations of program traders during the off-hours session,
a move which has been criticized. E.g., Edward H. Fleischman, The Perils of Longer MarketHours, N.Y.
TIMES, May 26, 1991, § 3, at 11.
The SEC also authorized the NYSE to open a half-hour earlier, though the NYSE later declined to
do so because member firms, particularly those with offices on the West Coast, protested that the move
would be too expensive. See Floyd Norris, Big Board Won't Add to Hours, N.Y. TIMEs, July 30, 1991, at
Dl.
77. SEC Approves AMEX Proposalto Begin its Own After-Hours Trading Program,DAILY REP. FOR
ExEcUTiVm (BNA), Aug. 12, 1991, at A6.
78. Labaton, supra note 72, at Al; Floyd Norris, NASDAQ at Night: Risks in Tradesin the Dark,N.Y.
TIM , Jan. 21, 1992, at DI; see also NASD, NASDAQ International (1990) [hereinafter NASDAQ
International] (unpublished pamphlet, on file with author).
79. See Macey & Haddock, supranote 1, at 323, 332-37,361-62; Seligman, supra note 1, at 116, 12939.
Though these authors do not explicitly endorse dealer markets, the policies they favor would bring
our markets closer to this model of trading. For example, these critics urge the SEC to abolish "off-board
trading restrictions"-exchange rules such as NYSE Rule 390 that require members to trade listed securities
only on stock exchanges. See Macey & Haddock, supra note 1, at 323, 332-37; Seligman, supra note 1,
at 137-38.
Repealing off-board trading restrictions could promote competition among dealers. Big institutional
firms such as Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs, which are NYSE members, would become free to trade
and make markets in NYSE-listed securities off the floor. Thus, these firms could begin competing with
specialists. The current system, based on a single specialist, might give way to a system of competing dealers
(if the institutional firms believed they would profit by making markets in listed securities).
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among specialists, big institutional trading houses, and over-the-counter marketmakers for the position of market-maker in particular securities. This
competition, they claim, would increase the total supply of capital devoted to
market-making, and would also narrow spreads.Y°
For three reasons, these critics have too much faith in dealer markets.
Granted, having more capital for market-making in a dealer market will enhance
liquidity; when market-makers have more capital, they can engage in more
trades without having to add leverage to their positions. Nevertheless, auction
markets can generate liquidity in a way that dealer markets cannot; brokers in
the trading floor and are
an auction market bring a steady stream of orders to 81
trade.
a
to
side"
other
"the
as
serve
to
available
thus
In addition, even if heightened competition between dealers would narrow
spreads on dealer markets, customers still might not get as good a price as they
would have received on an auction market 8 2 Because dealers trade as
principals with the customer, they have an incentive to give an inferior price.
Admittedly, though, this incentive is tempered by the dealer's fear of losing
business to competitors over the long term. But even so, auction brokers' only
incentive is to get their customer the best price.
Furthermore, in auction markets, investors can trade "in between the
spread"' 3 to improve pricing accuracy; this rarely happens on a dealer market

This increased competition among dealers advocated by Seligman, Macey, and Haddock could
undermine auction trading, however, because off-board trading restrictions provide conditions useful-if
not necessary-to such trading. See Kalman J. Cohen et al., An Analysis of the EconomicJustificationfor
Consolidationin a Secondary Security Market, 6 J. BANKING & FIN. 117, 135 (1982) (arguing that with
complete elimination of off-board trading restrictions, fragmented dealer markets would replace superior
centralized auction system); see also James L. Hamilton, Marketplace Fragmentation, Competition, and
the Efficiency of the Stock Exchanges, 34 1. FIN. 171, 171 (1979) (claiming that while off-board trading
promotes competition among dealers, it also, through fragmentation, may reduce market efficiency, widen
spreads, and increase variance in daily stock prices).
By preventing members from trading off the floor, off-board trading restrictions assure a steady stream
of orders for the auction, thereby promoting better liquidity and price discovery. A broker is presumably
more likely to find a match for his customer in a large pool of orders than in a small one. Moreover, the
securities market price, a consensus judgment about the value of a security, is presumably more likely to
factor in allrelevant information-and thus be efficient-when it incorporates the judgments of many
traders, rather than merely a few. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, at 174 (noting that "fragmentation of the
order flow to bolster interdealer competition could impair the quality of the market by obscuring the
information content of the order flow"). Thus, by advocating the repeal of off-board trading restrictions,
all of these critics implicitly are advocating a competitive dealer market model.
80. Macey & Haddock, supra note 1, at 348-49; Seligman, supra note 1, at 130, 136; see also Kerry
Cooper et al.,
Liquidity, Exchange Listing, and Common Stock Performance (Aug. 1983) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (claiming that for a given level of firm capitalization, listing on exchange
does not increase liquidity); David A. Dubofsky & John C. Groth, Exchange Listing and Stock Liquidity,
7 1 FIN. REs. 291 (1984) (claiming that over-the-counter markets provide more liquidity than exchanges).
81. See Simon & Colby, supra note 16, at 86-87 n.428 (citing studies that claim that auction markets
provide better liquidity than dealer markets).
82. See id. (citing studies that claim that auction markets provide better returns and a lower cost of
capital than dealer markets).
83. Specifically, if the specialist quotes a spread of 1/4 1/2 (meaning that he is prepared to pay a seller
1/4 for a stock and to sell the same stock to a buyer for 1/2), two commission brokers are nevertheless free
to trade "in between the spread" at 3/8. In so trading, each broker secures an extra 1/8for his customer.
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because dealers generally post a spread and stick to it. The NYSE claims to
save investors billions each year by improving prices,8 a benefit that would
be lost if the SEC channeled all trading to dealer markets.
Of course, advocates of auction markets could use these arguments to claim
that their format is superior, and thus to criticize the SEC for failing to impose
it. Dealer markets, however, offer advantages for certain types of issuers and
investors. First, such markets are more accessible because they can operate with
fewer people and can therefore remain open for longer hours without incurring
prohibitive labor costs. 8 6 Moreover, dealer markets afford a better trading
environment than auction markets do for thinly capitalized stocks. 87 Finally,
investors who are particularly averse to execution risk-the risk that, within
the brief interval between a customer's call to the broker and the execution of
her order on the floor, the price will move against her-may prefer to trade in
certain dealer markets.88 The adverse price movement that creates execution
risk is inherent to the auction format. It can derive either from random
fluctuations in the market or from the actual effect of the customer's order.8 9
In contrast, in dealer markets that offer "firm" quotes, which oblige dealers to
execute trades at the posted price, investors face no execution risk. In this type
of dealer market, the bid-ask spread-the compensation investors pay to
dealers-serves as an insurance premium risk-averse investors can pay to shift
execution risk to dealers; 90 these investors would therefore object if the SEC
imposed auction trading on all market participants.

84. The NYSE has argued that approximately 38% of trades in NYSE-listed securities were executed
on the floor at prices superior to the best available quotation. Reproposal of an Order Exposure Rule,
Exchange Act Release No. 19,372 1982 SEC LEXIS 51, at *19-20 (Dec. 23, 1982).
85. Actually, advocates of the auction market have tended not to call upon the SEC to prescribe their
format. Instead, these commentators usually only argue that the SEC should not regulate them out of the
marketplace by, for example, repealing off-board trading restrictions. See, e.g., Donald L. Calvin, The
NationalMarket System: A Successful Adventure in Industry Self-Improvement, 70 VA. L. REV. 785, 795
(1984).
86. Cf. OFFIcE oFTEHNoLoGY AssEsMirENT, supranote 71, at3 3 (noting that an auction market such
as the NYSE "may find it difficult to extend its trading hours because of its labor-intensive trading system").
In fact, the NYSE had to back out of a plan to open 30 minutes earlier partly because such a move was
prohibitively expensive. See Norris, supra note 76, at Dl. In contrast, dealer markets have been moving
rapidly toward 24-hour trading. See generally NASDAQ International, supranote 78; Labaton, supranote
72, at Al; see also text accompanying note 78.
87. In auctions, trades occur only when compatible customer orders meet. When there are fewer
customers, as is the case with a thinly capitalized security, their trading preferences are less likely to be
compatible. As a result, few trades will occur. Dealer markets, on the other hand, function well even for
thinly capitalized securities because dealer markets do not require two customers for each trade. A lone
customer can trade with the dealer. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, at 137-38 (describing the role of the dealer
in facilitating trades).
88. A stock "moves against" the buyer by going up in price and moves against the seller by going
down.
89. More specifically, since a bid increases demand in the market as a whole, a large bid can raise the
price of the security, sometimes significantly.
90. Marco Pagano & Ailsa Roell, Auction Markets, Dealership Markets and Execution Risk 13 (Mar.
1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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A third camp of critics has urged the SEC to oversee the development of
a fully automated ("black box") trading system, which all traders would be
required to use. Two varieties of black box trading have been proposed. In the
first variety-termed a computerized limit order book (CLOB)-customers
input their orders into a giant computer that finds matches. The computer ranks
the orders according to their prices. Within price categories, the computer fills
bids and offers in the order in which they entered the system. Junius Peake,
Morris Mendelson, and R.T. Williams recommend the CLOB model, 91 and
the Cincinnati Stock Exchange utilizes such a system. 92 The other model,
called the single price auction, provides price discovery by duplicating a live
auction. Just as on a CLOB, customers input orders into a computer. Instead
of matching all compatible orders, however, the computer finds a single marketclearing price and fills all orders for this price. 93
Advocates of black box trading claim that their computers could fill orders
rapidly, cheaply, and accurately. While such systems seem appealing and may
eventually dominate securities trading, the SEC should nevertheless be wary
of developing or mandating such a system. To do so, the Commission would
have to make a difficult choice between the CLOB and the single price auction
approach. Though single price auctions provide price discovery, and therefore
promote efficiency in resource allocation, they do not offer continuous
trading. 94 Thus, customers must wait until designated trading times. Such
delays would be intolerable to many sophisticated investors, especially
"program traders," who rely on precisely timed, coordinated, rapid trading.
In contrast, a CLOB offers continuity, but no price discovery, because it
never generates a single market-clearing price. A CLOB also fails to protect
customers against adverse price movements. The seller may input an offer at
41 when the security is selling at 40. But if the stock races up to 45, the seller
will nevertheless still sell at 41. If instead the customer had placed a "market
order" with a broker on an auction market, giving the broker discretion to seek
the best price, the customer might have sold at 45. In a sense, if 41 was the
91. Junius W. Peake et al., The National Book System/An Electronically Assisted Auction Market,
(1976) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (submitted to SEC); see also Simon M. Lorne & Morris
Mendelson, Regulation in a NationalMarket Environment, in TH1E DEREGULATION OF THE BANKING AND
SEcuRrTIEs INDUSTRY 31,44-51 (Lawrence G. Goldberg & Lawrence 1. White eds., 1979) (advocating black
box trading as the "market form of the future"); Morris Mendeison et al., Toward a Modern Exchange: The
Peake-Mendelson-WilliamsProposalforan ElectronicallyAssistedAuction Market, in IMPENDING CHANGES
FOR SECURITIES MARKETS: WHAT ROLE FOR THE EXCHANGE? 53, 54-60 (Ernest Bloch & Robert A.

Schwartz eds., 1979) (proposing electronic market composed of central computer which stores limit orders,
prints quotes on national tape, and is linked to national clearing system).
Others have echoed their suggestion. E.g., Forsythe, supranote 20, at 46-50 (noting the advantages
of computerized trading systems); Stern, "The Market is a Price, Not a Place," supra note 20, at 41
(discussing arguments in favor of replacing specialists and trading floors with automation); Welles, supra
note 20, at 74 (suggesting that exchange trading is less efficient than automation).
92. Hansell, supra note 17, at 92; SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, at 83.
93. See supratext accompanying notes 49, 66-69 for a discussion of SPA-works, a single-price auction
system.
94. ELECTRONIC BULLS & BEARS, supra note 1, at 63.
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customer's reservation price, it may be more socially efficient for him to sell
at 41. 95 Yet because the customer knows that a CLOB offers no protection
against adverse price movement, he might be reluctant to trade on such a
system unless he could constantly monitor his order and cancel it at will.
Because this sort of monitoring is expensive, investors forced to trade on a
CLOB would probably engage in fewer trades, thus undermining liquidity. In
fact, the Cincinnati. Stock Exchange has attracted only moderate volume,9 6
primarily because the cost of monitoring its electronic system is typically higher
than the cost of a NYSE commission.
Given that computerized trading still labors under imperfections, the SEC
would be ill-advised to force these systems upon traders. If such systems really
provide trading that is cheaper, faster, and more accurate, they will quickly
dominate a competitive market. Systems with these advantages, but none of the
current systems' shortfalls, would overwhelm the flimsy opposition of interest
groups displaced by automation. In short, administrative fiat is unnecessary.
Private sector competition should channel trading to the most effective
execution system.
B. Statutory Constraints
Critics have alleged not only that benign restraint is an unwise policy, but
also that the SEC's statutory mandate bars this restrained approach. Specifically,
Seligman, Macey, and Haddock claim that the 1975 National Market System
amendments 97 require the SEC to create a system of competing dealer markets
95. Similarly, some students of corporate takeovers have argued that in the regulation of tender offers,
rules that ensure a shareholder her reservation price-but no more-are socially efficient. See, e.g., Alan
Schwartz, Search Theory and the Tender Offer Auction, J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 229, 242-46 (1986)
(arguing that takeover auctions are unnecessary to ensure that ownership goes to those who value it most).
96. Poser, supra note 1, at 926-27.
97. The following is the text of the relevant portion of the statute:
(1) The Congress finds that(A) The securities markets are an important national asset which must be preserved and
strengthened.
(B) New data processing and communications techniques create the opportunity for more
efficient and effective market operations.
(C) It is in the public interest and appropriate for the protection of investors and the maintenance
of fair and orderly markets to assure(i) economically efficient execution of securities transactions;
(ii) fair competition among brokers and dealers, among exchange markets, and between
exchange markets and markets other than exchange markets;
(iii) the availability to brokers, dealers, and investors of information with respect to
quotations for and transactions in securities;
(iv) the practicability of brokers executing investors' orders in the best market and
(v) an opportunity consistent with the provisions of clauses (i) and (iv) of this
subparagraph, for investors' orders to be executed without the participation of a dealer.
(D) The linking of all markets for qualified securities through communication and data
processing facilities will foster efficiency, enhance competition, increase the information available
to brokers, dealers, and investors, facilitate the offsetting of investors' orders, and contribute to
best execution of such orders.
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linked by high-tech communications systems.9" In support of their claim, these
critics focus on its legislative history and on the events that gave rise to the
statute. According to these authors, beginning with its Institutional Investor
Study of 197199 and continuing in various other policy statements, the SEC
called for the creation of a "National Market System" in which various marketmakers would compete. 1°° Congress, they also claim, ratified the SEC's policy
in the National Market Amendments.
In support of this claim, Seligman, Macey, and Haddock pick out selections
of the legislative history that seem to support this interpretation. 0 1 This
reading of the statute is questionable, however. The policy of the SEC during
the five years before the statute's enactment is far from dispositive because the
policy created an intense debate within the industry, and it was this debate that
gave rise to the statute. As Donald Calvin has pointed out, Congress staked out
a position that was more moderate than the SEC's, deliberately refraining from
endorsing dealer markets:
The language of the 1975 Amendments ...

is as revealing for what

it omits as for what it includes....
... Congress very carefully avoided calling for the homogenization
of all markets into a central market system, a thought that had gained
some currency during the discussions, debates, and hearings that
preceded the 1975 legislation.1 2

(2) The Commission is directed, therefore, having due regard for the public interest, the
protection of investors, and the maintenance of fair and orderly markets, to use its authority
under this chapter to facilitate the establishment of a national market system for securities (which
may include subsystems for particular types of securities with unique trading characteristics) in
accordance with the findings and to carry out the objectives set forth in paragraph (1) of this
subsection.
Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 7, 89 Stat. 111 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78kI(a)(1), 1(a)(2) (1988)).
98. Macey & Haddock, supranote 1, at 321-24, 331-37 (arguing that 1975 amendment required SEC
to repeal off-board trading restrictions and to develop communications and trade reporting systems);
Seligman, supra note 1, at 80-82, 116-30 (claiming that 1975 amendment authorized SEC to remove
"barriers to competition" such as off-board trading restrictions).
99. U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT (1971).
100. E.g., Seligman, supranote 1, at 80-82. Seligman cites a 1972 statement by the SEC that it intended
to
enhance the competition which now takes place among the separate exchange markets and
between all of them and the third market (non-exchange member over-the-counter dealers in
exchange listed securities) [while] centralizing all buying and selling interest and maximizing
market-maker capability... so that securities can be bought and sold at reasonably continuous
and stable prices, and to ensure that each investor will receive the best possible execution of
his order, regardless of where it originates.
Id. at 81 (quoting U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. CONm'N, STATEMENT ON THE FUTURE STRUCTURE OF THE
SECURMES MARKET 1-9 (1972)).

101. See Macey & Haddock, supra note 1, at 322-31; Seligman, supra note 1, at 119-22.
102. Calvin, supra note 85, at 789, 791 (emphasis deleted).

1992]

Benign Restraint

1569

Instead, the statute appears to allow for a policy of benign restraint.
Through the amendments, Congress merely endorsed a set of characteristics and
authorized the SEC to nurture markets with these characteristics, without
specifying how the SEC was to pursue this goal. A restrained regulatory
approach that emphasizes competition seems thoroughly consistent with the
statute's text and legislative history. The statute endorsed "fair competition
among brokers and dealers, among exchange markets, and between exchange
markets and markets other than exchange markets."' 3 The House Conference
report similarly called for a restrained regulatory approach:
The objective [of the statute] is to enhance competition and to allow
economic forces, interacting within a fair regulatory field, to arrive at
appropriate variations of practices and services. Neither the markets
themselves nor the broker-dealer participant in those markets should
be forced into a single mold. Market centers should compete and
evolve according to their own natural genius and all actions to compel
uniformity must be measured and justified as necessary to accomplish
the salient purposes of the Securities Exchange Act, assure the
maintenance of fair and orderly markets and to provide price protection
for the orders of investors.1°4
Avoiding a "single mold" and allowing market centers to "compete and evolve
according to their own national genius" sounds very much like benign restraint.
In pursuing this strategy, the SEC is well within the parameters of its statutory
authority.
C. The FragmentationConcern
Critics have noted that the SEC's restrained regulatory strategy could lead
to a "fragmented" securities market, where a given security would be traded
in several places, rather than in one centralized location.105 Price discovery
could be less effective on such a market, and customers might fail to secure
the best price for their orders. In a nonfragmented market, where all bids and
offers go to the same place, orders are guaranteed to interact and, consequently,
orders to buy and sell at the same price are sure to give rise to a trade. In a
fragmented marketplace, matching orders may never meet each other if they
06
are routed to different markets.1
Some suggest that fragmentation is a frivolous concern, a disingenuous
intellectual shield that monopolists in the securities industry use to protect their

103. 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(1)(C)(ii) (1988).
104. H.R. REP. No. 123, 94th Cong., ist
Sess. 51 (1975), quoted in Calvin, supra note 85, at 792 n.20.
105. See, e.g., Richard L. Stem, The Shrinking of the Big Board, ECONOMIST, Feb. 16, 1991, at 67.
106. See generally SCHVWART , supranote 4, at 169-87 (discussing various types of fragmentation and
their effects on different market formats).
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positions of privilege. 10 7 When the NYSE warns of the perils of fragmentation, this view suggests, it is merely seeking to induce the SEC to protect
its market share.
In reality, fragmentation is a genuinely perilous condition 8 because the
inability of complementary orders to meet each other not only can harm the
welfare of the parties to the potential transaction-which would increase in a
consensual exchange-but also can injure the economy as a whole. Because
securities trades signal to the economy the values that investors assign to a
particular economic resource,'0 9 blocking these trades would deprive the
economy of significant messages concerning the most efficient allocation of
resources.
Fragmentation can also plunge a securities market into a destructive vicious
cycle. Brokers generally are reluctant to reveal their orders on a market unless
they expect to find a matching order because their disclosure may induce the
0
market to move against them, particularly if their order is large."
Consequently, if traders view a market as fragmented, they may decide to take
their business to another market or to abstain from trading altogether. In this
way, the market becomes more fragmented and less liquid. Conceivably, these
unfortunate effects could occur in America's securities markets if the SEC's
restrained regulatory strategy led to excessive fragmentation."' Indeed, by
encouraging the development of new systems, the SEC ensures that some order
flow will be diverted from the primary market.
Yet even with these risks, fragmentation is probably the lesser of two evils.
While the SEC could immunize the markets against the ills of fragmentation
by prescribing a single trading scheme, the agency would run a grave risk of
selecting the wrong system from the current candidates." Moreover, even
if the SEC happened to choose the correct system, the chosen trading
environment would become less efficient, less reliable, and generally less
effective at maximizing societal wealth once it became a legally protected
monopoly. In order to have competition, and the technological innovations and

107. See, e.g., Pat Widder, SplinteringMarket WorriesNYSE, CHL TRIB., Mar. 18, 199 1, at CI (quoting
University of Chicago Professor Merton Miller "[lIt's not at all clear that fragmentation is hurting the
public. Monopolists [such as the NYSE] always make that argument").
108. See, e.g., Cohen et al., supra note 79, at 117, 135 (arguing fragmentation on auction markets
reduces overall utility of investors); Haim Mendelson, Consolidation, Fragmentation, and Market
Performance, 22 . FIN. & QUANTrrATIVE ANALYSIS 189, 197-206 (1987) (claiming that in auction or
"clearinghouse" markets, fragmentation reduces volume of trades, increases price variance confronted by
individual traders, and reduces expected gains from trading).
109. See GROSSMAN, supra note 6, at 1-2.
110. When a buyer bids above the market price, he may inadvertently drive up this price, thereby

trapping himself in a situation in which he must increase his bid still further to trade. SCHWARTZ, supra
note 4, at 308.
111. Controlling theNew Wall Street: Can the SEC EncourageNew TradingSystems IVithout Breaking
Up the Market?, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Jan. 28, 1991, at 18.
112. See infra Part IV.
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lower costs which would accompany it, we should be willing to accept the risk
of some fragmentation.
Currently, though, fragmentation is not a serious concern. The volume on
America's securities markets is large enough to ensure that liquidity would not
dry up even if order flow were channeled away from the primary market. In
addition, communications technology now permits traders to monitor and trade
on several markets at the same time. Thus, a market will not necessarily be
fragmented even when orders have been placed on trading systems thousands
of miles apart.1

3

Even if fragmentation were to undermine liquidity, the SEC could remedy
the situation without prescribing a single trading format. In fact, the SEC has
already experimented with two mechanisms-market links and order exposure
rules-that could combat fragmentation in a restrained manner. During the early
1970's, the SEC linked the nation's exchanges by requiring them to erect an
"Intermarket Trading System": a communications network that enabled traders
at different exchanges to interact with one another." 4 The Commission has
also tried various order exposure rules that require traders, before trading on
a secondary market such as a regional stock exchange, to "expose" their order
on the primary market first (e.g., the NYSE for NYSE-listed stocks). Order
exposure rules avert fragmentation because they ensure that all orders in a listed
security are initially exposed at a single location, the primary market, even
though they may ultimately be traded on a secondary market (if,for example,
the order is not filled on the primary market)." 5 if necessary, the SEC could,
as David Lipton has urged, promulgate a "best execution rule," which would
impose an obligation on traders to search the various markets to find the best
price for their customers." 6 A combination of these strategies-which would
still allow various markets to rely on different trading formats and technologies-should be sufficient to counter the ill effects of fragmentation.
D. Insufficient Protectionfor Small Investors
Critics of the SEC's restrained regulatory policy have pointed to its
potential effect on small investors. Relying on competition to shape our
execution systems might be ill-advised if the private sector would favor large
institutional investors at the expense of small investors. While perhaps

113. Hans R. Stoll, Comments on "An Analysis of the Economic.ustification for Consolidationin a
Secondary Security Market," 6 . BANKING & FIN. 137, 140 (1982) (noting that "execution of transactions
does not require face-to-face communication").

114. Charles C. Cox & Bruce A. Kohn, Regulatory Implications of Computerized Communicationsin
SecuritiesMarkets, in TECHNOLOGY AND THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETs, supranote 12, at 7,

10.
115. See Reproposal of an Order Exposure Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 19,372, 1982 SEC LEXIS
51 (Dec. 23, 1982).
116. Lipton, supra note 1, at 499-505.
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distasteful in its own right, such favoritism would also discourage small
investors from trading, thus undermining capital formation, price discovery, and
the maximization of wealth. 117 In addition, the small investor might have little
choice but to trade in a forum dominated by large investors because any system
dominated by small investors would probably not have sufficient volume to
provide meaningful liquidity.
Fortunately, competition should yield a trading environment that is
reasonably favorable to small investors. Since individuals make up a considerable (albeit shrinking) portion of the investing public," 8 brokers and
dealers have incentives to retain the business of small investors. The NYSE,
for example, has rules requiring its members to execute the earlier limit orders
of small investors before later orders of large customers." 9 The Exchange
presumably promulgated these rules as a way to attract customers, rather than
as a concession to public-spirited regulators. Moreover, large and small
investors generally seek similar characteristics in execution systems,
characteristics such as liquidity, speed, accuracy, and low cost. Large investors
have the incentives and means to gather information about the relative merits
of competing systems and should, as sophisticated consumers, be able to induce
the owners and operators of execution systems to improve service. 21 Small
investors can then free ride on large investors' expertise and market power.
Finally, to the extent that small investors feel disadvantaged, they can simply
trade through large investors by placing their money with an intermediary, such
as a mutual fund or pension plan. At least for now, the SEC need not intervene
to protect small investors.'
IV. THE ADVANTAGES OF BENIGN RESTRAINT

The SEC has wisely perceived the pitfalls of prescribing a particular
execution system. Competition among a host of execution systems provides
many advantages for the investor. For example, the NYSE and NASDAQ strive

117. See SCHWARTZ, supranote 4, at 174.
118. About 18% of trades in 1988 were made on behalf of individual investors. ELECTRONIC BULLS
& BEARS, supranote 1, at 28.
119. SCHWARTZ, supranote 4, at 39-40 (unlike market orders, which are either executed immediately
or "killed," limit orders can remain in effect until canceled by the customer).
120. The increasing ability of large shareholders to monitor and negotiate with corporate management
has been well documented. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, ShareholderPassivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L.
REV. 520, 575-95 (1990) (arguing that shareholder activism serves as constraint on management). Similarly,
these shareholders should be able to wield comparable influence with owners and operators of execution
systems.
121. However, the SEC may ultimately have to intervene to defend small investors. While some features
of execution systems are "objectively" desirable, in that they benefit small and large investors alike (e.g.,
accuracy and reliability), other features benefit large investors at the expense of smaller ones (e.g., the
execution of large orders before small ones). To ensure fair markets that can attract capital, the SEC might
have to intervene to correct such biases. Such intervention would represent an appropriate-although
limited-exception to benign restraint.
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to gain a competitive advantage over one another by upgrading their equipment,
lengthening their hours, and trimming their costs. This frenzy of competition
has produced a state of the art trading environment,' " yielding considerable
advantages for customers.
In addition, since investors have varied preferences, a single format cannot
satisfy all customers as well as a menu of options can. For instance, investors
who particularly wish to avoid execution risk typically favor dealer markets,
while customers willing to tolerate some execution risk in order to preserve
their chances of improving upon the dealer's spread usually prefer auction
markets." Satisfying both types of investors maximizes society's overall
utility.
Since technology and the world economy are constantly evolving, the
United States would be well advised to have several trading formats, rather than
a single system; this diversity helps forestall the risk that changing conditions
will render all the existing systems obsolete. During the early 1970's, for
example, technological innovations in computers and communications
technology lent new appeal to dealer markets that could capitalize on these
advances.' 24 Prior to these technological advances, auction markets were the
preferred system, and the NYSE was the undisputed industry leader.'25 If
before this era the SEC had required stocks to be traded only on auction
markets, the NASD's dealer markets would have ceased to exist. There would
have been no institution poised to capitalize on the advent of these new
technologies, and NASDAQ might never have emerged.
The free market should determine the nation's mix of trading systems
because the market, unlike the regulator, is adept at aggregating investors'
preferences.' 26 While a sampling of investors may describe their predilections
to the SEC at a hearing, this data is anecdotal, imprecise, and skewed toward
the views of large, organized investors. The surest evidence of an investor's
preference is the way she spends her money. By bringing her business to one
execution system rather than to another, an investor discloses which format she
favors.
Government regulators not only have an imperfect view of investors'
preferences, they also cannot clearly assess the capabilities of various trading
systems. Since technology and global economic conditions are constantly
changing, the planners of a trading system can never be certain about how it
will perform, how it will be received, or how other systems would have
122. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text (noting existence of many new systems and
improvements in existing systems yielded by private sector competition).
123. See Pagano & Roell, supranote 90, at 1.
124. See Simon & Colby, supra note 16, at 34-44 (discussing automation of over-the-counter markets).
125. See id. at 17 (noting that before development of NASDAQ, over-the-counter markets were "a
murky backwater, completely overshadowed by the exchange markets").
126. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 491-507 (3d ed. 1986) (describing the
ability of markets to maximize consumer utility).
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compared to the system they chose. No planner has sufficient information to
27
know ex ante, with certainty, that he is making the correct choice.
While private sector planners also confront this obstacle, they can more
effectively combat it. The SEC's staff is smaller than the staffs of most firms
and considerably smaller than the staffs of all private sector firms in the
aggregate. Thus, the market can pour more time and money into research than
the government can.1L2 Furthermore, the explorations conducted by the private
sector as a whole will be more varied and thorough than the SEC's research.
Different firms will adopt varying perspectives on the problem of designing a
trading system, while the SEC, a single entity, might have to focus its efforts
on just a few angles. In a world with perpetually changing goals, the public is
best served by a regulatory system that harnesses the promise offered by a
diversity of approaches. Finally, the profit motive provides a better incentive
121
than those that motivate SEC personnel.
The SEC is also at a disadvantage relative to the private sector when
correcting its mistakes. In a free market, competitors may implement
innovations at will without risking a penalty more severe than the loss of their
capital. In contrast, when a regime is controlled by regulators who designate
the systems that private actors may use, an innovator must appeal to the
regulator for permission to implement his contribution. Progress can become
bogged down in a regulatory mire and may never proceed. In addition, by
winning over the regulators, whether honestly or otherwise, a firm in a
regulated environment could block its competitor's advances to the detriment
of the public, while it would be unable to do so in a free market. 3
In many regulatory areas, the market cannot perform its tasks without
abusing the public trust. The regulation of execution systems is unique,
however, because the actions of regulators and of private actors both serve the
same ultimate purpose: the maximization of societal wealth.' Both regulators
127. See Poser, supranote 1, at 946-51 (noting that the SEC as an institution is better suited to policing
existing market structures than to developing new ones); see also Charles E. Lindblom, The 'Science' of
Muddling Through, 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79-88 (1959) (noting that information constraints handicap
government planning).
128. See Lee B. Spencer, Jr., Comment, in TECHNOLOGY AND THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL
MARKETS, supra note 12, at 53-55 (arguing that limited funding constrains SEC's ability to regulate

"proactively").
129. See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY Do
IT 115-36 (1989) (noting that incentives can drive government bureaucracies to suboptimal outcomes).
130. See MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROwTH, STAGFLATION,

AND SOCIAL RIGIDrrIs 63 (1982) ("Special-interest groups ... slow growth by reducing the rate at which
resources are reallocated from one activity or industry to another in response to new technologies or
conditions."); see also George J Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL 3. ECON. & MGMT.
SCI. 3 (1971) (arguing that regulation is "actively sought by industry" as a way to protect market share and
supracompetitive returns).
131. See PHIFLPS & ZECHER, supra note 3, at 19 (describing "market failure theory" of securities
regulation, which argues that purpose of securities regulation is to promote greater economic efficiency by
assuring that prices and outputs are "fully competitive"); see also supra note 4 and text accompanying notes
4-9 (discussing the public interest at stake in the regulation of execution systems).
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and private actors seek to offer efficient, effective capital formation and price
discovery. 13 2 In recent years, the private sector has effectively promoted the
public interest. As described in Part II, private firms have produced a host of
new trading systems and have dramatically improved established systems. The
fact that the private sector has produced Instinet, Super-DOT, SPA-works, and
off-hours trading at the NYSE and NASDAQ demonstrates its ability to
improve the markets, and thus to advance the public interest.
Of course, regulators practicing benign restraint will still play an important
role. They must ensure that the incentives of firms operating execution systems
continue to be aligned with the public interest. 133 Thus, if execution systems
began unfairly discriminating against small investors, the SEC should curtail
such practices.'3 Moreover, the SEC should affirmatively encourage
competition among execution systems. At times, it may have to knock down
barriers and assist fledgling competitors-as it did with Delta Options and SPAworks through liberal statutory interpretation. 135 These are limited exceptions
to benign restraint, however.
When the market will not pursue the public interest, regulation may be
essential. Regulation is inappropriate, however, when the market can advance
the public interest more effectively than a public sector planner can, as is the
case for execution systems. Private sector competition will yield a smoothly
functioning market. Intrusive actions by regulators-who have only limited
resources and imperfect information-would, in most cases, merely obstruct
progress. Thus, critics who fault the SEC for regulating too "passively" are
misguided. In the regulation of execution systems, benign restraint is the wisest
course.

132. See, e.g., ELECTRONIC BULLS & BEARS, supra note 1, at 6 (suggesting that honest market
participants and general public share same objectives).
133. Id. (noting that government may have to intervene when "self-interests of market participants
create resistance to desirable market improvements or modernization").
134. Since small investors free ride on large investors' research and do not offer economies of scale
in trading, some differential treatment may be justified. See supra note 121 and accompanying text
(discussing protection of small investors).
135. See supra text accompanying notes 59-69.

